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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action by virtue of the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. S. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1953 as amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court 
properly held that Mrs. Atherley had presented no evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably find that Albertson's had selected a 
method of displaying strawberries that created a potentially 
dangerous condition, that Mrs. Atherley had presented no evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably find that it was foreseeable to 
Albertson's that the acts of third parties relating to the 
strawberry display and marketing method could create a haza1 d, and 
that, on the basis of those findings, whether the trial court 
properly granted Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment by 
dismissing Mrs. Atherley's negligence claim against Albertson's. 
On appeal from the granting of summary judgment, the appellate 
court will not defer to the trial court's determination of whether 
there are material facts in dispute, will view the facts in a light 
most favorable to the party against which summary judgment was 
entered and review the legal conclusions of the trial court for 
correctness, affording it no deference. Canfield v. Albertsons, 
Inc. , (Utah App. 1992), Cert, denied 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R at 71 through 90.) and the argument 
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of plaintiff's counsel as contained in the transcript of the 
hearing on defendant's motion show that this issue was preserved in 
the trial court. (R at 131 through 157.) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The only determinative provision of law in this appeal is Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is set 
forth verbatim in the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a tort action for negligence arising out of injuries 
received by Mrs. Atherley while a customer in one of Albertson's 
stores. In addition to the cause of action for negligence, Mrs. 
Atherley's Complaint stated causes of action for the torts of 
conversion, trespass, and breach of privacy. Mrs. Atherley's 
conversion, trespass, and breach of privacy claims were dismissed 
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Subsequent to plaintiff's Complaint and defendant's Answer 
being filed, the parties undertook a period of discovery. 
Defendant then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 
filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing was held before the trial 
court on defendant's motion on April 7, 1995. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
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The trial court ruled from the bench granting defendant's 
motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's negligence claim 
only. The trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's negligence 
claim was entered on July 13, 1995. (R at 115 through 118.) 
Plaintiff/appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed on August 9, 1995. 
(R at 125 through 126.) 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On April 8, 1992, Mrs. Atherley was a customer in Albertson's 
Kearns, Utah store. As she was walking through the store in the 
area adjacent to Albertson's produce department, Mrs. Atherley 
accidentally stepped on a strawberry that was on the floor causing 
her to fall to the floor. Mrs. Atherley was injured in the fall. 
(R at 1 through 9 and 91 through 92.) 
Mrs. Atherley provided evidence in the form of affidavit 
testimony that strawberry on which she stepped and slipped was 
approximately six (6) feet away from the table holding Albertson's 
strawberry display. (R at 92.) 
Mrs. Atherley provided evidence in the form of affidavit 
testimony that there were no barriers around the strawberry display 
table to prevent strawberries from rolling on to the floor, that 
there were no floor mats around the strawberry display, and that 
the strawberries were displayed in open containers. (R at 92 
through 93.) The fact that strawberries were displayed in open 
containers as a marketing approach is uncontested as is the fact 
that Albertson's had available to it, and actually employed, 
alternative methods of displaying strawberries in closed containers 
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greatly reducing the possibility of spillage and the creation of a 
hazard to shoppers. (R at 90.) Mrs. Atherley also produced a 
photograph for illustrative purposes showing displays of 
strawberries in open containers and without barriers or floor mats. 
(R at 95.) 
Albertson's witness, Glenn Wilkes, stated in his affidavit 
that "the edge of the dry tables on which strawberries and similar 
produce are displayed have barriers that surround the edges of the 
tables which are three of (sic) four inches high and they 
effectively keep the produce on the table." (R at 65.) (emphasis 
added) This testimony was disputed by Mrs. Atherley's testimony 
and representative photograph and inconsistent with the photograph 
provided by Mr. Wilkes and attached to his affidavit. (R at 68.) 
The trial court had evidence before it from which the jury 
could conclude that Albertson's could foresee that its method of 
displaying strawberries in open containers would commonly result in 
strawberries ending up on the floor, thereby creating a hazard to 
Albertson's customers. In his affidavit, Mr. Wilkes testified that 
"it is not uncommon to see a piece of produce (i.e., grape, 
strawberry, lettuce leaf, etc.) on the floor...." (R at 66.) The 
trial court also had evidence that Albertson's had knowledge of a 
pattern of customer behavior relating to openly-displayed produce 
that often created the kind of hazard that caused Mrs. Atherley's 
injuries. (R at 66.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Utah law recognizes two separate and distinct legal 
theories under which a store owner may be liable for a patron's 
slip and fall. The trial court failed to view the two theories of 
liability separately. Instead, the trial court merged the two 
theories, effectively depriving Mrs. Atherley of her opportunity to 
present her case against Albertson's under the second theory of 
liability. By requiring Mrs. Atherley to meet the notice 
requirement of the first theory, the trial court improperly found 
cause to dismiss Mrs. Atherley's negligence claim pursuant to 
Albertson's motion for summary judgment. 
II. In challenging Albertson's motion for summary judgment, 
Mrs. Atherley presented the trial court with evidence supporting 
her negligence claim under the second theory of liability. She 
established that Albertson's chose a method of operation whereby 
strawberries were openly displayed in uncovered cartons. She 
presented evidence that Albertson's could foresee that the acts of 
third party customers in relation to the openly-displayed 
strawberries could result in strawberries falling or being dropped 
to the floor. Finally, she presented evidence to indicate that 
Albertson's did not act reasonably to protect its customers from 
the dangerous condition created by its method of selling 
strawberries because it failed to put barriers around the 
strawberry display to stop strawberries from rolling to the floor 
and failed to place non-skid floor mats around the strawberry 
display. Despite having these facts and the issues raised by them 
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at hand, the trial court, contrary to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the long history of case precedent relating to 
summary judgment, granted Albertson's motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed Mrs. Atherley's negligence claim. 
III. The trial court improperly ruled as a matter of law that 
Albertson's method of display was not dangerous. In making its 
ruling, the trial court improperly took over the role of factfinder 
from the jury. The trial court erred in making this determination 
as a matter of law. The question of whether Albertson's chosen 
method of displaying strawberries was dangerous is fact sensitive 
and may not be decided as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH LAW CONCERNING STORE 
OWNER LIABILITY TO PATRONS AND IMPROPERLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. The Trial Court Failed To Properly Apply the Tests Defined 
By the Utah Court of Appeals In Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc. 
Much of the argument contained in this brief was made to the 
trial court in Mrs. Atherley's behalf in the context of her 
opposition to Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment. These 
arguments failed below because the trial court failed to correctly 
interpret the law as it has developed relating to premises 
liability. Utah law recognizes two separate and distinct theories, 
either of which may be applied to determine if a store owner is 
liable for its patrons' slip and fall injuries. The two applicable 
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theories are defined in Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 841 P. 2d 
1224 (Utah App. 1992), Cert, denied 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
In general, there are two legal theories under which a 
store owner may be found negligent and held liable for a 
patron's injuries in a "slip and fall" case in Utah. The 
first theory involves situations where there is a 
temporary or transient hazard within the store that was 
not created by the store owner, its agents, or employees. 
Under this theory, in order to find a store owner 
negligent, it must be shown that the store owner "knew or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of 
any hazardous condition and had reasonable opportunity to 
remedy the same." [Citations omitted.\ 
The second theory, which governs the case before us, 
involves situations where the store owner, its agents, or 
employees create or are responsible for the dangerous 
condition. Under this theory, a plaintiff does not need 
to establish notice since a store owner is deemed to have 
notice of the dangerous condition it creates. 
Canfield, page 1226. 
It should not have been necessary for Mrs. Atherley to 
persuade the trial court that Albertson's had actual or 
constructive knowledge that the particular strawberry on which she 
fell had fallen or been dropped to the floor. The trial court 
insisted, however, that Mrs. Atherley meet this burden and 
interpreted Canfield to require the showing of actual or 
constructive notice as part of the requirement of satisfying the 
second theory of liability. The trial court commented from the 
bench that it 
[had a hard time seeing why it should hold Albertson's] 
liable or at least allow it to go to the jury when there 
is nothing to give me reason to believe that 
[Albertson's] had notice of [the strawberry] and that 
[Albertson's] had notice that [the strawberry] was in a 
dangerous condition and that it was foreseeable that this 
person would fall on that strawberry or any person would 
fall on that strawberry. 
(R at 146 through 147.) (emphasis added). 
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Albertson's placed substantial emphasis on the fact that 
neither it nor Mrs. Atherley knew precisely how the strawberry had 
found its way to the floor. The trial court apparently found this 
point significant. Mrs. Atherley could not, at the summary 
judgment phase of her case, and cannot now show that Albertson's 
had actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of that 
strawberry on the floor where she fell. The law as defined in 
Canfield relieves Mrs. Atherley of that harsh and inequitable 
burden of proof. 
In this case, Ms. Canfield alleges that she slipped on a 
lettuce leaf on the floor near a display of farmer's pack 
lettuce. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to Ms. Canfield, Albertson's chose a method of displaying 
and offering lettuce for sale where it was expected that 
third parties would remove and discard the outer leaves 
from heads of lettuce they intended to purchase. It was 
reasonably foreseeable that under this method of 
operation some leaves would fall or be dropped on the 
floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous 
condition. Because Albertson's chose this method of 
operation, the question of whether Albertson's had 
notice, either actual or constructive, is not relevant. 
The relevant question is whether Albertson's took 
reasonable precautions to protect customers against the 
dangerous condition it created. 
Canfield, page 1227. (Emphasis added.) 
The facts in Canfield are strikingly similar to those in Mrs. 
Atherley's case. In Canfield, Albertson's displayed lettuce in 
what is commonly called a "farmer's pack" at the end of one of the 
produce display tables. The individual heads of lettuce were not 
wrapped and were placed in boxes allowing customers to sort through 
the heads of lettuce in making their selection. These factors 
differentiated the "farmer's pack" from lettuce sold individually 
wrapped in cellophane. Customer's regularly discarded the outer 
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leaves of the "farmer's pack" lettuce. Albertson's had placed 
empty boxes around the lettuce display to provide a place where 
customers could throw the discarded leaves. At least one of the 
discarded leaves apparently missed the empty box and ended up on 
the floor where Ms. Canfield stepped on it, slipped, and fell. 
In Mrs. Atherley's case, Albertson's displayed strawberries in 
uncovered boxes and containers which customers could sort through 
and "pick as many strawberries as they want." (R at 90.) 
Albertson's, at the same time, also displayed strawberries for sale 
"in quart containers (i.e., closed plastic containers); and ... in 
three packs (i.e., a closed container that holds three pints of 
strawberries) ; . . . " (R at 90. ) It can be said that the 
strawberries sold in uncovered boxes were marketed in a "farmer's 
pack." 
Allowing customers to sort through "farmer's pack" 
strawberries and lettuce may be good marketing and may allow 
Albertson's to achieve maximum sales by presenting an attractive 
display to customers but, by allowing customers to pick through the 
strawberries and package the strawberries themselves, Albertson's 
created a risk that strawberries would either fall to the floor or 
be dropped there by customers. It was undisputed below that 
Albertson's chose this method of marketing strawberries. (R at 90 
and 66.) Albertson's argued, however, that because Mrs. Atherley 
could not show how that strawberry got to the floor she was not 
entitled to her day in court. Under Canfield, Mrs. Atherley does 
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not have to show how the strawberry reached the floor in order to 
prevail in her negligence claim against Albertson's. 
The method of operation, displaying strawberries in open 
containers, was chosen by Albertson's. (R at 90.) Evidence was 
before the trial court establishing that Albertson's knew that 
customers would sort through, bump, or knock strawberries out of 
the display and even drop them from uncovered containers off of a 
display that did not have a barrier to prevent them from falling to 
the floor. (R at 66 and 90.) Canfield established that: 
[W]here the store owner chooses a method of operation 
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable 
acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, 
an injured party need not prove either actual or 
constructive knowledge of the specific condition. 
[Citation omitted.] In this type of case, notice is 
satisfied as a matter of law because the store owner is 
deemed to be informed of the dangerous condition since it 
adopted the method of operation. 
Canfield, page 1226. The Court went on to state that: 
To relieve the plaintiff of the requirement of proving 
actual or constructive notice in such instances is to 
effect a more equitable balance in regards to the burdens 
of proof. [Citation omitted]. 
Canfield, page 1227. 
The evidence presented to the trial court by Mrs. Atherley 
raised sufficient issues of fact to satisfy the second theory of 
liability set forth in Canfield. Mrs. Atherley showed that 
Albertson's chose the method of operation, i.e., selling 
strawberries in open containers. She presented contested evidence 
that the tables on which the strawberries were openly displayed had 
no barriers to prevent strawberries from rolling to the floor and 
that there were not mats around the table to reduce the risk from 
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strawberries that had fallen. (R at 92 through 93.) She also 
established that Albertson's knew that customer actions commonly 
resulted in strawberries, grapes, and peanuts falling to the floor, 
thereby satisfying the foreseeability requirement. (R at 66.) 
The trial court refused to recognize the separate and distinct 
nature of the second theory of liability defined in Canfield or to 
relieve Mrs. Atherley of the harsh burden of proof which is 
effectively eliminated by the second theory. Instead, the trial 
court merged the two theories and, because Mrs. Atherley could not 
show actual or constructive notice as required in the first theory 
of liability, dismissed her negligence claim against Albertson's. 
The trial court's inability to separate the two theories is clear 
in its pronouncement from the bench: 
The Court also finds that there is no evidence that the 
store had any opportunity to remedy the single strawberry 
that was on the floor had they had -- nor that they had 
any notice that it was there until the accident occurred. 
Thus there is no potential for the Court to find that 
there was adequate foreseeability of the store to be held 
liable, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
is granted. (R at 156.) 
The foreseeability required by the second theory of liability is 
not the same as the notice requirement of the first theory. The 
clear and obvious purpose of the second theory of liability defined 
in Canfield is to relieve plaintiffs of the notice requirements of 
the first theory, yet the trial court required Mrs. Atherley to 
prove notice in order to satisfy the foreseeability requirement. 
This Court could not have made the distinction any clearer than it 
did: 
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In this type of case, notice is satisfied as a matter of 
law because the storeowner is deemed to be informed of 
the dangerous condition since it adopted the method of 
operation. 
Canfield, page 1226. The trial court's improper merging of the two 
theories of liability renders the entire purpose of this Court's 
holding in Canfield meaningless. 
II. Mrs. Atherley Presented Sufficient Evidence To Overcome 
Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Because Mrs. Atherley raised issues of fact sufficient to 
state a cause of action under the second theory of liability set 
forth in Canfield, it was improper for the trial court to dismiss 
her negligence claim pursuant to Albertson's motion. The trial 
court was determined, however, not to let Mrs. Atherley's claim go 
to a jury. In Canfield, this Court held that: 
In deciding whether the trial court correctly determined 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact, we do 
not defer to the trial court's determination of whether 
there are material facts in dispute, but review the facts 
and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. [Citation omitted.] Any 
doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are 
resolved in favor of the losing party. [Citation 
omitted]. Ms. Canfield also challenges the trial court's 
legal conclusions which we review for correctness, giving 
no deference to the trial court. [Citation omitted]. 
Canfield, page 1226. The standard of review expressed by this 
Court in Canf ield has been established through a long line of cases 
in the Utah appellate courts. It recognizes the harsh nature of 
summary judgment rulings and the fact that summary judgments 
deprive the losing party of the opportunity to present her claim to 
the factfinder. In Mrs. Atherley's case, the factfinder, by 
Albertson's choice, is a jury. 
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In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the moving party 
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." (Addendum, page 1. ) Albertson's did not meet that burden 
in relation to Mrs. Atherley7s claim and summary judgment was 
improper. 
The critical material facts have been set forth and addressed 
in the Statement of Facts and section "I" of the argument, above. 
Mrs. Atherley presented ample evidence from which a jury could find 
that Albertson's chose a method of operation that resulted in the 
creation of a hazard, that it was foreseeable to Albertson's that 
the acts of customers in conjunction with its method of operation 
could result in the creation of a hazard, and that Albertson's 
failed to take adequate precautions (no barriers or floor mats) to 
protect its customers from the risk of injury. Again, turning to 
Canfield for guidance: 
Given Albertson's decision to use farmer's pack displays, 
the inquiry therefore becomes whether Albertson's did 
what was "reasonably necessary to protect the customer 
from the risk of injury that mode of operation is likely 
to generate." [Citations omitted.] This inquiry 
necessarily focuses on the store owner's actions prior 
to, or contemporary with, the creation of the dangerous 
condition. Each determination of whether the protective 
measures taken were reasonable is fact sensitive.... In 
any event the fact finder must determine whether the 
store owner's vigilance in protecting against a condition 
or hazard was commensurate with the risk created by the 
method of operation [Citation omitted.] 
Canfield, page 1227. 
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Instead of recognizing that Mrs. Atherley had presented 
material issues of fact sufficient to defeat Albertson's motion, 
the trial court put itself in the role of the jury and weighed the 
facts in reaching its decision. 
I have seen the farmer cases. I just saw it recently in 
-- on the 17th of March when they had Saint Patrick's Day 
and they had cases of cabbage right next to the corn 
(sic) beef, and the cabbage was in farmer-packed cases, 
and people were picking off leaves and things like that, 
and there was some risk associated with that, and the 
cases were out in front of the meat counter. So I can 
see that....But I have a harder time seeing why, when 
they have a normal stand of distribution and one 
strawberry falls, that I should hold them liable or at 
least allow it to go to the jury when there is nothing to 
give me reason to believe that they had notice of 
it....(R at 146.) 
The trial court actually argued facts that should have been 
considered and assessed by a jury. The mere fact that the trial 
court entered into an analysis comparing cabbage to strawberries 
establishes that there was a sufficient issue of material fact that 
deserved to be heard by a jury. 
It is for a jury to decide if the facts presented by Mrs. 
Atherley are sufficient to meet the requirements of the second 
theory of liability and allow Mrs. Atherley's recovery against 
Albertson's. The trial court refused to allow the evidence to be 
examined by the jury and, in so doing, deprived Mrs. Atherley of 
her day in court. The trial court held Mrs. Atherley to a standard 
higher than the law allows by requiring her, in effect, to prove 
that her evidence was sufficient for her to win the case. Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and all of the case law 
interpreting the rule require only that the party present issues of 
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material fact. Mrs. Atherley met that requirement and the 
dismissal of her negligence claim was improper. 
Ill. The Trial Court Improperly Ruled As A Matter Of Law That 
Albertson's Method Of Display Was Not Hazardous Or Risky 
The trial court's ruling dismissing Mrs. Atherley's negligence 
claim as a matter of law was contrary to generations of legal 
precedent cautioning against summary judgment in cases where facts 
are in dispute and subject to more than one interpretation. In 
particular, in relation to negligence claims, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that: 
As a general proposition, summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its 
merits, and should be employed "only in the most clear-
cut case." (Citations omitted.) 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 
1989), Cert, denied 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). 
In some ways, it appears that the trial court was more 
concerned with making tort law than applying the law as it has 
developed and is so clearly defined in Canfield. This is evident 
from the following statement made by the trial court: 
If I follow your argument, I must come to the conclusion 
that they must take any of these items that are subject 
to sorting and prepackage them in a closed container, and 
I don't think that that should be the objective of the 
Court. They ought to be entitled to package as they 
wish. Someone purchasing may wish to purchase less than 
the packaged amount of any kind of prepackaged items. (R 
at 145.) 
It is up to the factfinder to determine if Albertson's should be 
able to "package as they wish" without incurring any liability for 
its chosen method of operation. It was improper for the trial 
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court to make that determination as a matter of law in a summary 
j udgment proceeding. 
Finally, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that: 
The method of the display has not been shown to the 
Court's satisfaction to be in any way inappropriate or 
hazardous or risky. (R at 156.) 
It was improper for the trial court to rule on the appropriateness 
of Albertson's method of display as a matter of law. This Court 
held in Canfield that: 
[T]he trial court erred in determining, as a matter of 
law, that Albertsons acted reasonably in its attempts to 
protect its customers from the dangerous condition. This 
determination is fact sensitive and may not be decided as 
a matter of law. 
Canfield, page 1228. (Emphasis added.) The determination of 
whether a method of operation creates a dangerous condition is 
equally fact sensitive and not a matter for summary judgment. Mrs. 
Atherley is entitled to present her case to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly dismissed Mrs. Atherley's 
negligence claim on Albertson's motion for summary judgment. Mrs. 
Atherley presented facts to the trial court which were sufficient 
under the second theory of liability defined in Canfield to avoid 
summary judgment and to go to a jury. The trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the holding in Canfield and, as a result, held 
Mrs. Atherley to a higher standard, based on the merging of the two 
theories of liability, than she should have been required to meet. 
The trial court improperly took over the role of factfinder in 
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analyzing and weighing Mrs. Atherley's evidence and in dismissing 
her claim on its merits. The trial court's analysis intruded into 
the role of the factfinder. Albertson's obtained summary judgment 
too easily in this case because the trial court failed to apply the 
proper standard in determining the appropriateness of that harsh 
remedy. 
Summary judgment. . .should be granted with extreme caution 
where the negligence of the property owner is alleged. 
(Citation omitted.) Issues involved in negligence 
"become questions of law only when the facts are 
undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from 
them." (Citation omitted.) 
Canfield at 1226. 
Justice demands that the trial court's summary judgment order 
be reversed and that this matter be remanded so that Mrs. Atherley 
can present her case to the jury, the only proper factfinder in 
this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this g/3i^ay of February, 1996. 
Don R. Schow 
Mark R. McDougal & Associates 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Lynn F. Atherley 
4360 South Redwood Rd., Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
(801) 969-2424 
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P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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ms 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
fcult judgment where notice is required only Default judgments against the United States 
jjy custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383 under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
failure of party or his attorney to appear at Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190 
Atrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303 Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134 
gjile 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
..expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
amotion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
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forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 
Written statement of grounds. 
Cited. 
Affidavit 
—Contents. 
Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Out-
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 
(Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff that con-
tained opinion, legal conclusions, and facts not 
supported by adequate foundation but portions 
of which complied with Subdivision (e), be-
cause the objectionable statements did nothing 
more than supplement the arguments made in 
plaintiff's memorandum, did not prejudice de-
fendants. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
—Corporation. 
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a 
corporation, it is generally considered to be the 
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the 
personal knowledge of an agent of the corpora-
tion who is not a corporate officer regarding 
the facts to which he has sworn will generally 
not be presumed, and therefore, the specific 
"means and sources" of his information should 
be shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. 
Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). 
—Experts. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows the expert 
to state his opinion concerning the ultimate 
issue in the case, and an expert affidavit must 
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the 
opinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit is suffi-
cient if it articulates the facts upon which the 
opinion was based and if the facts were of the 
"type usually relied upon by experts in the 
field." Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
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RLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
RANDALL D. LUND ( A 5 6 1 7 ) ^ ^ * ™ " 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU SALi LMKC COUNTY 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 9y 
Post Office Box 45000 ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendant Albertson's Inc. 
Do»l»¥ C ! P * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN F. ATHERLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERTSON'S, INC. 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940904525FI 
Judoe David S. Youna 
Defendant Albertson's ("Albertson's") Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing on the 7th day of April, 1995, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Davis S. Young 
presiding. Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Don R. 
Schow, and Albertson's was represented by its attorney, Randall 
D. Lund. The Court having heard oral argument by counsel for 
both parties and having previously reviewed the memoranda, 
affidavits and other documents submitted by counsel for the 
parties in connection with Albertson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and otherwise being fully advised in the circumstances, 
finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
Albertson's is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I 
22 
of Plaintiff's Complaint for Negligence because despite the 
express requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
1. Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence 
indicating that Albertson's employees created a condition or 
defect which proximately caused, created or otherwise contributed 
to the creation of the alleged temporary hazard; 
2. Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence 
indicating that Albertson's method of operation made it 
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties 
would result in the creation of the alleged temporary hazard; 
3. Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence that 
Alfe^ rtson's had notice of the temporary hazard cr that, through 
the exercise of reasonable care, Albertson's should have known of 
the temporary hazard before the alleged accident occurred; and 
4. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that Albertson's had 
notice of the hazard, Plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence 
that Albertson's had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the 
temporary hazard. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby 
granted and summary 3udgment is hereby entered m favor of 
-2-
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Defendant Albertson's, Inc., on Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint 
for Negligence, with both parties to bear their own costs. 
DATED this /3"^day of CVci^f , 1995. 
Davip SJ. i Young 
Districts Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARK R. MCDOUGAL & ASSOC, 
By JAr^ 
Don R. Scfiow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SH\RDL\15-631.032\ATw£RLEY.0R:) 
-3-
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Suzanne H. Hurst, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Defendant Albertsons, Inc. herein; that she served 
the attached ORDER (Case Number 940904525PI, Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County) upon the parties listed below 
by placing a true and correct copy theyreof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Don R. Schow 
MARK R. MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4360 South Redwood Road, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the (f day of July, 1995. 
t jpt^^^x'^ 
Suzanne\ H. Hurst 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before Stile this // ^ day of July, 
1995 
N0TAR# PUBLIC ~T 
esiding in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
w s r - L • : . - • 
y Jfc. - - ,
 fc. - 1 5 
STATU OF UTAH 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COL 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN F. ATHERLEY 
Plaintiff 
vs . 
ALBERTSON'S. INC 
Defendant 
No. 940904525 PI 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Aoril 7, 1995 
Defendant's Motion for Summarv Judament 
Reported by 
Lori Lawrence, CSR. RPR, CP 
File No. 
0 40795LL 26 
ALPHA 
Court Reporting Service 
P.O. Box 510047 
SLC, Utah 84151-0047 
(801) 532-5645 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
For the Plaintiff Mr. Don R. Schow 
MARK R. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES 
4360 South Redwood Road 
Suite 1 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84123 
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For the Defendant: Mr. Randall D. Lund 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAl" 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84111 
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1 I Salt Lake Citv, Utah: April 7, 1995: 10:10 a.m 
2 
3 I THE COURT: All right. The next matter to be 
4 considered is the matter of Lynn Atherley versus 
5 Albertson's, Inc., Case No. 940902 -- or 4525. Counsel, 
6 state your appearances, please. 
7 MR. SCHOW: Don R. Schow for the plaintiff, Lynn 
8 Atherley. 
9 MR. LUND: Randall D. Lund for Albertson's, 
10 Incorporated, defendant. 
11 THE COURT; All right. Mr. Lund, it's your 
12 motion for summary judgment. 
13 MR. LUND: Thank youf your Honor. If it please 
14 the Court and counsel: It's interesting how you can come 
lb to work one day and receive a case that will in some way 
16 change your life or stay with you for a long time, and that 
17 happened to me several years ago when I came to work. It 
18 was my first Albertson's case. Received information on a 
19 claim by one Mary Canfield, and since that time. I don't 
20 think I've ever had a professional day that's gone by that 
21 I haven't heard something about the case of Canfield versus 
22 Albertson's. 
23 And in approaching the Court todayf I feel that 
24 it's my responsibility really to distinguish between the 
25 case of Canfield versus Albertson's and this case and in 
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that resoect show whv summarv iudament is merited in this 
case 
Now, the facts of this case are very 
straightforward. We have a plaintiff who was walking in an 
Albertson's store. She slipped and fell on a strawberry. 
It's a given fact that she did not see the strawberry 
before she stepped on it. 
Now, this photograph is the best that we have, 
and we apologize for the qualitv of it, but this is a 
photograph of the produce area. At this end, we have where 
the strawberries were displayed, and in this area right 
here is where the slip and fall occurred. The purpose of 
this line, of course, is a measurement from the end of this 
display table to the corner, which we submit is about 
twenty-five feet. Now, that is a disputed fact by the 
plaintiff, but we submit that it's really not relevant in 
light of the law that we're going to discuss today. 
Your Honor, there are some similarities between 
the case of Canfield versus Albertson's and Lynn Atherlev 
v. Albertson's. We have a slip and fall. We have the same 
defendant. We have the same defense attorney. We have no 
opportunity for notice. There's not much dispute about 
notice, but there are significant distinctions, and that's 
what I'd really like to talk about for a moment. 
The first distinction that I think is important: 
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In the case of Canfield versus Albertson's, the accident in 
question took place right in front of the farmers' pack 
3 I lettuce display. Now, little is talked about in the 
4 opinion of Canfield versus Albertson's about what a 
5 J farmers' oack lettuce disolav is, but in realitv it is a 
6 box of lettuce heads that have been shipped straight to the 
7 store by the farmer. Albertson's rips open the top of the 
8 box, they stick it out there, and people are allowed to 
9 come in. It's a very efficient way to sell lettuce. 
10 Now, the problem with that is you need to remove 
11 the outer leaves. They're not desirable. People don't 
12 want them. We know it, and the customer knows it, and we 
13 try to protect ourselves by putting garbage cans on the 
14 floor because we know those customers are going to walk in 
15 I and take those lettuce leaves off, and they're going to 
16 discard them, and they're on the floor. 
17 And in the case of Canfield versus Albertson's, 
18 there was testimony by a number of Albertson's employees 
19 who testified that this was a known problem, that those 
20 lettuce leaves were there, they were discarded, and despite 
21 the boxes, they ended up on the floor. There is no similar 
22 factor in this case. 
23 The slip-and-fall incident, well, in our -- to 
24 our respect, we submit occurred twenty-five to thirty feet 
25 awav from the strawberrv displav. Plaintiff admits, 
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nevertheless, that it was six to ten feet away, so the 
proximity is different. 
The knowledge of the store is different. We 
knew, with respect to the lettuce heads, that lettuce was 
5 | being discarded on the floor. There is no evidence in this 
6 | case of any similar problem with respect to strawberries. 
I think, your Honor, that it's important to 
8 | distinguish between a case like Canfield, where you have a 
9 | constant, recognizable problem, and the general 
10 | consequences of running a store. We put things on shelves. 
11 I People come into stores. They buy things off shelves. 
12 They bring their kids. They bring their families, and the 
13 policy of the court has never been to force these 
14 supermarkets to become insurers. It's always been to ask 
15 them to apply reasonable standards. 
16 Now, because these things are in the produce area 
17 because they're displayed for sale, people can look at 
18 them. They can put them in their grocery cart, and for any 
19 number of reasons, they can end up in any number of places 
20 in many different areas in the store. 
21 And so you have to distinguish between the 
22 situation where the store does something in Canfield that 
23 it knows causes a problem and the facts of this case where 
24 we have a strawberry. We have no idea how it got there, we 
25 have no idea where it came from, and the plaintiff herself 
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admitted that she doesn't know how long it had been there. 
So for those reasons, we submit that the notice law applies 
in this case. 
Now, we submit that plaintiff has raised the 
issue of Canfield for this reason. They want to circumvent 
the notice argument. In Canfield, the Court held if, in 
fact, you can show that the store has done something to 
create the hazard, we are going to waive the notice 
provision of the law* 
Now, as the Court knows, it's usually a 
two-point -- or a two-prong test. Did the store have 
notice of the hazard? And, No. 2, did the store have an 
opportunity to remedy the hazard? If the plaintiff can 
respond to both of those positively, they can go to trial. 
If they don't have evidence on those two points, they 
can't, and in this case, there is no evidence on either 
point. 
Another distinguishing factor, your Honor, is 
just the absence of evidence in this case. One of the 
troubling aspects of Canfield is that, yes, there is. 
language in the case that talks about what happens when the 
store adopts a method of display that may create or 
contribute to the hazard, but in Canfield, we are inundated 
with the expert affidavits of the plaintiff talking about 
what were recognized standards for grocerv stores, what 
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stores were doina to orevent slio-and-fall accidents, what 
they could do, what they should do, what stores throughout 
the country were doing. 
There is no similar evidence in this case. The 
5 plaintiff has pointed to Canfield. They have said, "We've 
6 made this allegation. We've said that the strawberries 
7 were negligently displayed." 
8 Well, that argument fails, we submit, for two 
9 reasons. No. 1, there is no testimony from a person 
10 qualified to give an opinion as to what a reasonable method 
11 of display is with respect to strawberries. It's just not 
12 there. We have an allegation under Rule 56(e). It's not 
13 enough. No. 2. even if we were to assume that there is 
14 something wrong with the display, we've got the distance, 
15 at least six to ten feet, and Mrs. Atherley admits she 
16 doesn't know how it got there. 
17 So, your Honor, Albertson's argument, very 
18 briefly, is this. No. 1, we're entitled to summary 
19 judgment because we had no notice of the hazard. There is 
20 no evidence that anybody knew about this strawberry until 
21 after the accident. Certainly we had no opportunity to 
22 remedy the hazard until after the accident. 
23 And finally, even if we do apply Canfield, even 
24 if we assume that for some reason Albertson's should have 
25 known, that we're going to waive the notice requirement, 
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there's no evidence with respect to her negligence 
allegations. Be just her allegations. Unless the Court 
has any questions --
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lund. 
MR. LUND: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schow? 
MR. SCHOW: Thank you, your Honor. Defendant 
depends to a large extent in its motion on alleging that 
the plaintiff is relying on mere allegations of her 
complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment in that 
she's presented no fact presenting a genuine issue of --
genuine issue for trial, and that's simply inaccurate. 
If her affidavit merely stated Albertson's was 
negligent, then certainly that's a conclusorv statement and 
not sufficient to defeat summary judgments but the mere 
fact that the statements made in plaintiff's affidavit 
support the factual allegations of her complaint doesn't 
render those statements inappropriate, and it doesn't 
render them unable to -- to present facts to defeat summary 
judgment. 
There are soecific factual allegations made in 
the complaint. Those are supported by statements in her 
affidavit. The simple fact that they're in both places 
doesn't render them inappropriate in her affidavit. 
THE COURT: You concur that the law is that 
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Albertson's must have notice of the problem and, in 
addition, an opportunity to remedy that problem? 
MR. SCHOW: No, your Honor, not under Canfield. 
THE COURT: What do you think the Canfield law 
requires of Albertson's? 
MR. SCHOW: Your Honor, Canfield requires 
primarily that plaintiff be able to present facts from 
which the trier of fact can infer or believe that 
Albertson's first engaged or set up a dangerous method of 
operation. What that does is it establishes Albertson's 
not necessarily liability at that point, but it establishes 
Albertson's involvement in establishing that dangerous 
condition. 
Then the Canfield court does speak somewhat of 
foreseeability, but that's not the same thing as notice, 
your Honor. The notice that defense counsel has gone over 
again and again in his memoranda and before the Court this 
morning is notice under the other standard where plaintiff 
would have to show that Albertson's actually knew that 
strawberry was on the floor and failed to do something 
about it. 
Canfield doesn't require that. In fact, Canfield 
states that that is an unreasonable burden of proof to put 
on a plaintiff because a plaintiff isn't privy to the same 
information as the defendant is in these cases. 
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1 THE COURT: I don't have any problem with that 
2 phiJosophy myself, that the plaintiff shouldn't have to 
3 show sort of the old one-bite rule that somebody has 
4 done -- notice that they have an animal of a mean and 
5 mischievous disposition before they can get recovery. The 
6 problem that I have with this case is that whatever the 
7 distance, six to twenty-five feet, you have a single 
8 strawberry on the floor. At least that's the best evidence 
9 I've heard. 
10 MR. SCHOW: And that's the best evidence we have 
11 to date on that particular strawberry. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, and that strawberry could get 
13 there multiple ways. It could get there, one, by 
14 negligence of an employee, and that would have greater 
15 liability for Albertson's. It could get there by somebody 
16 putting strawberries in their basket and driving beyond the 
17 strawberries between six and twenty feet and having one 
18 spill out that they don't observe and it's simply on the 
19 floor, and I can see that Albertson's might be charged with 
20 a duty to know that people can spill goods as they travel 
21 around the store and that they should pick those up 
22 immediately, and there's no reason to believe that they 
23 would not had they had the opportunity to see this 
24 strawberry, and there's no reason to believe that they saw 
25 it and didn't pick it up. We don't have any evidence such 
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as that. 
But if the trier of fact has to have facts given 
to it that would cause one to conclude that there was some 
dangerous method of operation, what facts would you propose 
to establish that? 
MR. SCHOW: Those facts would be this, your 
Honor, and I don't think they're facts that we need to 
bring an expert in to determine. I think in this case, 
possibly Forrest Gump would be the best one to determine by 
lookina at the wav strawberries are displaved. that thev're 
open 
There are alternative methods, closed containers 
Albertson's markets them both ways, either in closed 
containers or openly. The open containers, a juror could 
say, create a bigger hazard because customers are, in 
effect, invited to handle individual strawberries, to pack 
them and overpack them and to abuse the system basically. 
But Canfield addresses that, your Honor. The 
Court in Canfield states, "There is no logical distinction 
between a situation in which the store owner directly 
creates the condition or defect and where the store owner's 
method of operation creates a situation where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third 
parties will create a dangerous condition or defect." 
Now, we have evidence of that foreseeabilitv, 
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1 | your Honor, not presented by plaintiff but presented by 
2 I defendant. In Paragraph 16 of his affidavit, Mr. Wilkes 
3 | states, "On occasion, as customers taste the produce or 
4 I give samples to their kids, they will drop the occasional 
5 grape, strawberry, or peanut on the floor wherever they 
6 happen to be in the store. Because customers occasionally 
7 drop produce from their carts as they shop, it is not 
8 uncommon to see a piece of produce -- example, grape. 
9 strawberry, lettuce leaf, et cetera — on the floor on the 
10 other side of the store." 
11 It is not uncommon to see this. This man with 
12 all of these years of experience is testifying to that 
13 fact, and that's why whether plaintiff can prevail or not 
14 on how far the strawberry was from the display is really 
15 not relevant because we have Albertson's own expert stating 
16 that is not uncommon to see these strawberries on the other 
17 side of the store. 
18 Now, here's what the -- the jury can infer from 
19 the facts that are already presented. First of all, from 
20 Mr. Wilkes' statement, look at the types of things he said 
21 it's not unusual to see. Strawberries, grapes, peanuts, 
22 and lettuce leaves. These are all things that Albertson's, 
23 by choice, displays openly and without protection. 
24 Now, it's a disputed fact whether there are 
25 barriers or mats around. These are things that could maybe 
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mitigate against Albertson's negligence, but those are 
2 I disputed facts. 
3 I But these are all items that have alternate 
4 methods of display. Grapes can be put in bags and sold. 
5 J Strawberries are put in plastic cartons that are closed 
6 that customers merely pick up and put in the cart, 
7 virtual]y eliminating any chance of spillage. Peanuts are 
8 marketed in an open display or also in bags, as are -- as 
9 is lettuce. The farmer pack display is very different from 
10 the standard display where each head of lettuce is wrapped 
11 in cellophane. 
12 These are facts that are now available for the 
13 jury, and the jury can look at that, combined with 
14 Albertson's own statement that this is a foreseeable 
J 
15 problem, and it's foreseeable, because of the way they 
16 choose to operate in the display and marketing of 
17 strawberries and other loose produce, that the jury could 
18 infer negligence on the part of Albertson's under the 
19 J Canfield analysis. 
20 Under Canfield, plaintiff doesn't have to show 
21 that Albertson's failed to adequately monitor either. She 
22 simply has to show facts from which the jury could infer 
23 that a method of operation — in this case, the method of 
24 displaying strawberries open and loose for customers to go 
25 through -- is a dangerous method and some degree of 
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1 I foreseeability at least, which Albertson's has established, 
2 I as I said 
And there's really -- there's really not much 
difference between strawberries and lettuce, your Honor, 
5 I unless we're talking about what you're going to put on your 
6 I breakfast cereal. The same situation arises. Customers 
are free -- in fact, they're invited to do their own 
8 selecting, to do their own culling where strawberries are 
9 concerned. In other words, they see one that doesn't look 
10 very appealing. They're going to set that aside or do who 
11 knows what with it. 
12 But Albertson's has established it knows what the 
13 third-party customers are doing, and that's specifically 
14 what Canfield addresses. 
15 THE COURT: If I follow your argument, I must 
16 come to the conclusion that they must take any of these 
17 items that are subject to sorting and prepackage them in a 
18 closed container, and I don't think that that should be the 
19 objective of the Court. They ought to be entitled to 
20 package as they wish. Someone purchasing may wish to 
21 purchase less than the packaged amount of any kind of 
22 prepackaged items. 
23 For instance, mushrooms, they prepackage those, 
24 and we've all seen them with the cellophane over them. 
25 They also have a case of them that you can pick. If you 
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want ten mushrooms or one mushroom or whatever, you can 
2 I pick from that. Strawberries seem to lend themselves to 
3 I the similar kind of distribution, and I don *t quite see why 
somebody should be required as a store owner to so package 
them and sell them with cellophane wrapping just to avoid 
this kind of potential. 
MR. SCHOW: But, your Honor, when they choose 
that method of operation, then the foreseeability factor of 
third-party intervention kicks in. This is no different 
from Canfield. You can say the same thing about lettuce. 
THE COURT: Well, I frankly can see some 
difference in that. I have seen the farmer cases. I just 
saw it recently in -- on the 17th of March when they had 
Saint Patrick's Day and they had cases of cabbage right 
next to the corn beef, and the cabbage was in farmer-packed 
cases, and people were picking off leaves and things like 
that, and there was some risk associated with that, and the 
cases were out in front of the meat counter. So I can see 
that 
But I have a harder time seeing why, when they 
have a normal stand of distribution and one strawberry 
falls, that I should hold them liable or at least allow it 
to go to the jury when there is nothing to give me reason 
to believe that they had notice of it and that they had 
notice that it was in a dangerous condition and that it was 
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foreseeable that this person would fall on that strawberry 
or any person would fall on that strawberry. 
MR. SCHOW: Well, your Honor, again, plaintiff 
doesn't need to show notice. Plaintiff needs to show 
5 J basically foreseeability, and that foreseeability has been 
6 established. 
7 Now, we're not saying Albertson's should be held 
8 liable for any injury that arises out of a product carried 
9 m its store. Defendant points to the case where I guess a 
10 packaged piece of pumpkin pie ends up on the floor. Well, 
11 that's certainly less foreseeable than the strawberry 
12 J situation. 
13 What we're talking about here with strawberries 
14 and grapes and things are round, squishy fruit that present 
i 
15 a special hazard. It's the banana-peel syndrome. I mean 
16 if Albertson's invited people to peel bananas and eat them 
17 on the spot and someone dropped a peel, there might be a 
18 J problem. 
19 This isn't a problem with all produce or all the 
20 products marketed by Albertson's. If a customer drops a 
21 package of diapers on the floor, there's much less chance 
22 that a customer's going to fall over that and get injured, 
23 but a strawberry's a small item and is particularly squishy 
24 and slippery, and the way they market them, it's 
25 foreseeable to them by their own statement that customers 
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1 are going to feed their kids with it or they're going to 
2 overpackage them or they're just not going to take care of 
3 them, and by putting them in containers, that's safer. 
4 THE COURT: If I follow your argument, everybody 
5 that slips on a strawberry, grape, or almost any item of 
6 produce is entitled to go to the jury 'cause it's 
7 foreseeable that those could fall off the counters. If 
8 they slip on a package of diapers, they may not, or a can 
9 of beans if it is on the floor, they may not, but produce, 
10 because of the way it is marketed and packaged and sold, 
11 it's foreseeable that it can fall on the floor. 
12 MR. SCHOW: Well, I think the important point 
13 made in Canfield, your Honor, is that this is a method of 
14 operation chosen by Albertson's, and why is it chosen by 
15 Albertson's? Because it increases profit. They display 
16 these strawberries in the way they do because it's a very 
17 attractive way to display them. I appreciate buying 
18 strawberries that way, and I don't have to worry about a 
19 green one or a rotten one hiding in the middle of the box. 
20 That increases profitability, but they're paying a price 
21 for that, and a jury can certainly look at the facts of 
22 this case and determine whether that is reasonable or not. 
23 Going back to Canfield, the Court states, 
24 "Summary judgment should be granted with extreme caution 
25 where the negligence of the property owner is alleged. 
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1 I Issues involved in negligence become questions of law only 
2 when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can 
3 be drawn from them." 
4 More than one conclusion can be drawn here, your 
5 Honor. A jury could easily look at the facts of this case 
6 and say, "It's probably not a good idea to display 
7 strawberries like that. It's probably a dangerous 
8 condition." 
9 It's probably even more important to find for the 
10 plaintiff in this case because Albertson's knew — Mr. 
11 Wilkes doesn't say that people are always dropping coconuts 
12 or cucumbers or watermelons. He specifically states 
13 strawberries, grapes, and peanuts, these types of things. 
14 Albertson's knows that. It's known it for years. 
15 And just the mere fact that by some -- some great 
16 fortune no one has been hurt falling on a strawberry in the 
17 past few years shouldn't preclude the plaintiff from 
18 presenting those facts to the jury and saying, "You 
19 determine this. You determine, based on Albertson's own 
20 testimony and based on the way this display looks" --
21 contrary to Mr. Wilkes, no barriers. The Court's seen the 
22 pictures, and that's an outright misrepresentation to the 
23 Court, and if the defendant didn't think it was important 
24 to have barriers around strawberries, he wouldn't have made 
25 that misrepresentation in his affidavit. Even Albertson's 
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thinks those barriers are important. Even Albertson's 
thinks the floor mats are imoortant when it comes to 
squishy fruit 
Plaintiff's testimony is there were no barriers. 
5 I The pictures support that. There were no floor mats. The 
6 I pictures support that. There are very simple precautions 
7 I that Albertson's can make to render this potentially 
8 dangerous method of display much less so by placing 
9 barriers around and by putting floor mats down, nonskid 
10 floor mats. They didn't do that. These are other facts 
11 the jury should look at to determine whether that method of 
12 display is dangerous or not. 
13 And unless the Court has further questions, I 
14 just emphasize that the facts and inferences to be drawn 
15 I therefrom have to be viewed in a light most favorable to 
16 the plaintiff. Summary judgment simply is not appropriate 
17 in this case. The facts are sufficient for a jury to look 
18 at and determine if that is a dangerous method of operation 
19 and, based on Albertson's foreseeability, whether they 
20 should have some liability or all liability for the 
21 injuries suffered by the plaintiff in this case. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schow. 
23 MR. SCHOW: Thank you. 
24 MR. LUND: Can I just have a moment, your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: Certainly you may. Yes, Mr. Lund. 
45 
21 
1 I MR. LUND: Your Honor, I think perhaps the most 
2 | common misapprehension there with respect to Canfield is 
3 I this perception that it's overturned all these years of 
4 notice law that we have. It doesn't. 
5 The Court recognizes in Canfield and says in 
6 general that there are two theories which may be applied, 
7 and it goes on to talk about them. The first theory, of 
8 course, is a notice argument, which we've talked about. 
9 The second theory occurs and is triggered when -- and this 
10 is what the Court said, that the second theory usually 
11 requires that the store owner, its agents, or employees 
12 actually create the condition of the defect that causes an 
13 injury. 
14 We don't know what brought this strawberry to be 
15 here. The plaintiff admitted in her deposition testimony, 
16 "I don't know how it got there." For all we know, a small 
17 child could have brought it in with him from outside. We 
18 don't know how it got there. Truly, it is in the proximity 
19 of the strawberry display such as we have it. 
20 The plaintiff, who's introduced pictures which 
21 have no relevance to this case because this entire store 
22 has been gutted -- this is the only picture we have of the 
23 way the area looked on the day in question, and despite the 
24 poor quality, it's what we have, and you can see there's 
25 mats, there's tables with edges around them, the things 
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that the plaintiff is talking about. 
2 | But I submit that these things are really 
3 | irrelevant because the undisputed facts in this case are: 
4 I She doesn't know how it got there; she has no proof that 
5 Albertson's had any opportunity to do anything about it. 
6 And finally, I just ask the Court to imagine what 
7 a produce area would look like if all of the sudden the 
8 duty was to take everything and package it. Customers go 
9 in a produce area, and, as the Court pointed out, they sort 
10 through things. These are things the customers do, they 
11 have done forever, and they do it in every grocery store in 
12 the state. This method of operation isn't something that 
13 Albertson's has just chosen. It's something that every 
14 grocery store in the state uses. It's something that every 
15 1 grocery store in the country uses, and there is no evidence 
16 that that is negligent or unreasonable in this case. 
17 THE COURT: If I'm — we're dealing with a 
18 motion, though, for summary judgment. Where do I draw the 
19 1 line? Do I say, "Well, they had ten strawberries on the 
20 floor. Therefore, they should have known they had a 
21 dangerous condition"? Do I say, as Mr. Schow would have me 
22 say, that since the strawberries weren't wrapped, they 
23 could or should have known that the strawberries could fall 
24 to the floor and thus they should run the risk either of, 
25 one, wrapping all the strawberries or defending lawsuits? 
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And I have a hard time understanding if I should 
put on the plaintiff the burden to show more notice, more 
opportunity to cure, or just simply let it go to the jury 
and let the jury decide, "Well, gosh. We all go in stores 
and see things on the floor, and if we don't watch them and 
we fall, we may have to bear the burden ourse]f," or the 
jury may say, "Under the circumstances here, rather than 
having her bear the burden, Albertson's should have been 
more careful." 
I don't know. These cases, every case pushes the 
line at a different spot. 
MR. LUND: I agree, your Honor. It is a 
difficult call to make, but I think that we can clearly 
separate this case from Canfield. The case in Canfield 
involved a situation where there was an abundance of 
testimony that Albertson's knew that lettuce leaves were 
piling up around the display because every customer who 
went to that display was dumping lettuce there, and that's 
what the case talks about. The store employees knew this, 
and what did they do? They put boxes there in hopes of 
collecting this lettuce, in hopes of stopping the problem, 
and the only thing that Canfield went to trial on was 
whether or not that procedure, using the boxes, was 
reasonable 
We don't have that situation here 
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1 strawberries mounting up. We don't have evidence of any of 
2 the produce piling up and becoming a problem that's so 
3 problematic that the store is having to take remedial 
4 measures by putting boxes wherever they can for people to 
5 throw them into. 
6 You see, the foreseeability that needs to be 
7 focused on here is not the foreseeability that things are 
8 going to end up in the store, because that's just 
9 foreseeable to everybody. The foreseeability that they 
10 focused on in Canfield is that the customers were 
11 intentionally discarding this specific product and doing it 
12 I around the lettuce display. 
13 There is no evidence in this case that anybody 
14 did anything with intention with respect to this 
15 J strawberry. We just don't know, and under Rule 56(e), you 
16 can't go to trial based on just your allegations. You've 
17 got to come with some evidence. 
18 Now, she's come in, and she has alleged there was 
19 a strawberry on the floor, and we said, "That's right. 
20 There was a strawberry on the floor. We didn't know 
21 anything about it until we heard about the incident." We 
22 do the best that we can do with the procedures we talked 
23 about with the employee sweeping procedures. We do what we 
24 can to keep the floor clean. We instruct our employees to 
25 pick up things when thev see them. We do what we can, and 
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1 there is a clear line of cases for the last forty years 
2 insofar as I can tell where the courts have upheld the 
3 notice theory. 
4 I think Canfield, your Honor, is a very, very 
5 narrow case, and I think it applies to a situation where 
6 the plaintiff can come into court and can show that there 
7 is something wrong with the display, that there is 
8 something about that display which in and of itself can 
9 cause that hazard. 
10 In Canfield, for example, the Court made 
11 I reference to the situation where the shelves were slanted 
12 and it was potentially hazardous because the produce could 
13 fall off the rack by itself. 
14 There's no evidence like that here. The evidence 
15 in this case is simply that there's a strawberry on the 
16 floor and nobody knows how it got there, and when those are 
17 the facts -- and there is a long list of cases. Long v. 
18 Smith's, the pumpkin pie; Howard v. Aurback's, the oil; 
19 Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms and Albertson's where we 
20 have cottage cheese on the floor. We have Martin versus 
21 J Safeway where there was ice. All of these cases point out 
22 that if we don't know how it got there, you have to show --
23 and the plaintiff bears that burden of showing -- how the 
24 hazard had gotten there, how long it had been there, 
25 whether the store had an opportunity to remedy it. 
50 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR, LUND: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lund. Court finds 
that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be 
and the same is herein granted. The Court finds that there 
is no adequate basis for the Court to conclude that 
Albertson's had notice of the defect. The method of the 
display has not been shown to the Court's satisfaction to 
be in any way inappropriate or hazardous or risky. The 
Court also finds that there is no evidence that the store 
had any opportunity to remedy the single strawberry that 
was on the floor had they had -- nor that they had any 
notice that it was there until the accident occurred. Thus 
there is no potential for the Court to find that there was 
adequate foreseeability of the store to be held liable, and 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
If you'll prepare an order consistent, Mr. Lund. 
MR. LUND: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
(The matter concluded at 10:45 a.m.) 
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